Renaming States – A Case Study: Changing the Name of the Hungarian State in 2011.: Its Background, Reasons, and Aftermath by Takács, Péter
1 23
International Journal for the
Semiotics of Law - Revue
internationale de Sémiotique
juridique
 
ISSN 0952-8059
 
Int J Semiot Law
DOI 10.1007/s11196-020-09692-y
Renaming States—A Case Study: Changing
the Name of the Hungarian State in 2011.
Its Background, Reasons, and Aftermath
Peter Takács
1 23
Your article is published under the Creative
Commons Attribution license which allows
users to read, copy, distribute and make
derivative works, as long as the author of
the original work is cited. You may self-
archive this article on your own website, an
institutional repository or funder’s repository
and make it publicly available immediately.
Vol.:(0123456789)
Int J Semiot Law
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-020-09692-y
1 
Renaming States—A Case Study: Changing the Name 
of the Hungarian State in 2011. Its Background, Reasons, 
and Aftermath
Peter Takács1 
 
© The Author(s) 2020
Abstract
A provision of the Hungarian constitution, adopted in 2011, has renamed the state. 
The name changed from the Republic of Hungary to Hungary, while the form of 
the state has remained “republic”. The purpose of this study is to explore the mean-
ing, significance, and several consequences of this provision. The analysis consists 
of three main parts. The first one gives a general overview of the functions of the 
names of states. It claims that not only names but also changing or modifying names 
of states—taking place either by name-giving or by shaping convention—can serve 
certain functions. The second part focuses on the historical and constitutional details 
of renaming the Hungarian state, and summarizes the legal context that provided 
the framework for the 2011 renaming. The third part outlines the arguments for the 
change, takes a look at the official justification and actual reasons, and reveals some 
of the consequences of the name change in the past decade. The main contention of 
the paper is that the renaming of the Hungarian state that took place in 2011 lacked 
any overt and reasonable justification, and is best explained as an expression of anti-
republican sentiment, which indicated, and partly paved the way for the transition 
into a kind of an authoritarian regime. Finally, the study raises a possible interpre-
tation of the renaming of the Hungarian state in 2011, the point of which is that it 
adumbrated many later changes in public law and political systems.
Keywords Names of the Hungarian state during the twentieth century · The role of 
“republic” as a denomination of state in the context of Hungarian history · Semantic 
background and justification for renaming the Hungarian state in 2011 · Functions 
of country names and state titles · Country names and the collective identity of 
larger communities · Fundamental Law of Hungary
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The name of the Hungarian state changed several years ago. Between 1989 and 2011 
the title of the state was the Republic of Hungary which—pursuant to one of the pro-
visions of the 2011 Fundamental Law of Hungary—was replaced by Hungary as of 
1 January 2012, notwithstanding the form of the state has remained a republic. Why 
such a change happened, how did it take place and what consequences has it had? 
The past few years offer a sufficient perspective for answering these questions.
1  The General Context of Renaming States
Before analyzing the renaming a particular state, it seems appropriate to review two 
general questions that may play a significant role in interpreting such changes: what 
are the functions of the names of states in internal and external communication, and 
what is the social and political significance of states’ name-giving and name change.
1.1  Functions of Country Names and State Titles
Similar to personal names, country names and state titles have several functions in 
communication.1 In the case of the state titles, these are social and political by their 
character.
Just like in the case of every unique being, the names of states ensure the pos-
sibility of denoting and identifying them uniquely. Country names and names of 
states2 enable the invocation of individual states in different discourses as well as the 
relevant communication regarding to and on those states, namely to saying some-
thing about them. Moreover, under specific circumstances, the name displays the 
state, thus presents and “re-presents” the unique and existing states which may occur 
symbolically and expressively. All the more, in the case of so-called “picturesque” 
names, it can even evolve through some characterization. In the latter case, we can 
also talk about some degree of a description of the country and state in question, 
even if it consists of only one or two words. Instead of the objective enumeration of 
a phenomenon, the description sometimes stands for the formulation of the desirable 
1 Linguistics and communication theories discuss the functions of names in the context of proper names 
in detail—for the relevant scholarship that could be used for this purpose see [10, 19, 20, 42]—, general 
theories, however, have not been adapted yet to the names of states. One of the widely accepted general 
theories on the communicative functions of linguistic phenomena was developed by Roman Osipovich 
Jakobson who concentrated not only to the relationship of sender or recipient but of sender and recipient 
[see 24: 81–122]. According to my knowledge, there is no linguistic analysis in the literature that applies 
general literature, mentioned above, to the special issue of the function of state names.
2 Every state has two names: country name, which is the short-form of the name of state, and the long-
form of the name of state (in British English it is called state titles), which, in certain case, is consti-
tutional name. They are interchangeable within certain limits. Country names are quite often used to 
denominate states, the long-form of a particular state, however, does not necessarily refer to an actually 
existing country, especially in the case of politically divided communities.
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features of a phenomenon, or masks the undesirable traits, for instance when an 
authoritarian state or dictatorship is called “people’s democracy”. In other words, 
state titles—unlike personal names—may have functions that facilitate the accept-
ance of the political system of the state (legitimization). Since the state is perceived 
as a political community, the name may contribute to the confirmation and fortifica-
tion of the identity of this community or to the re-creation it (identity creation).3 Just 
like in the case of all names, the most basic function of state titles is to contribute to 
the guarding of a particular phenomenon’s identity (identity protection). One of the 
tools of identity protection includes the case when the name reminds the members 
of a particular community of its history. Sometimes this protection could take even 
“magical” form. This is the case when a substitute rather than “actual” name is used, 
to prevent the identity from being “stolen” (rather than forgotten), as e.g. in the case 
of “Rome”. In such cases, however, the substitute sooner or later may blur the origi-
nal or actual name, if there was any.4 Names may also have a reminding function or 
nature, which can be called a function of commemoration as well.
In short, names of states may thus perform the following main functions: (a) 
denotation, (b) identification, (c) description, (d) invocation, (e) supply or with-
drawal of information (communication in the narrow sense), (f) representation, (g) 
remembrance and reminder (commemoration), (h) legitimization, and (1) identity 
creation or identity protection.
It is not necessary for a name to fulfill all these functions at once or continuously; 
however, it needs to perform at least one or some of them. Regarding these func-
tions, the following three general statements can be made:
(1) It is possible that the same name fulfilling one of the functions in a certain 
communicative context may not work or may be dysfunctional in another one. 
Moreover, individual functions may even counteract in certain situations.
(2) Some functions may be interpreted negatively. For instance, it is possible that 
a particular mode of name fails to communicate something and seeks to with-
hold or mask (disguise) something. This may also be part of the communicative 
function, of course negatively.
(3) Certain functions only operate within the linguistic community of those speaking 
a particular language.
The detailed elaboration of these claims I begin with the latter which becomes 
evident in the case of “picturesque” or “talkative” names. A well-known example 
3 On the so-called identity-creating functions of geographical “place names”, in general, see [17: 105–
106]. For country names are “place names”, some of the findings of this paper can be adapted to the 
names of states as well.
4 It is known that by the eighteenth century the name of the so-called German-Roman empire—which 
was originally called Imperium Romanum, after 1157 Sacrum Imperium in the sense of being “conse-
crated”, finally after 1512 Sacrum Imperium Romanum Nationis Germanicæ—has become deceptive, 
as Voltaire’s sarcastic remark indicated in 1756. According to Voltaire “This agglomeration which was 
called and which still calls itself the Holy Roman Empire was in neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire” 
(Ce corps qui s’appelait et qui s’appelle encore le saint empire romain n’était en aucune manière ni 
saint, ni romain, ni empire). See [41: 416].
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of the descriptive function of names is provided by the name of Montenegro. For 
locals, its name is Цpнa Гopa (Crna Gora), which was introduced in Slavic lan-
guages by Italian in Romanic translation (monte: mountain, negro: black); thus, this 
country name means “black mountain” or “land of the black mountain” [29: 3]. Just 
like proper names, state names can have a reminding function by which they contrib-
ute to the forging or protection of community identity in a wider political commu-
nity. An interesting example is provided by Venezuela whose long name (Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela) refers to the late leader of the South American independ-
ence movement, president and subsequent dictator of Venezuela, Simón Bolívar.5
The fact that particular functions may also counteract does not, in itself, render 
names useless. The identification function of names may be operational even if their 
descriptive nature is questionable, namely if the content of the state name does not 
correspond to facts. Those who think that names cannot state the opposite of obvi-
ous facts often will be disappointed: states move within relatively wide limits in this 
regard. Certainly, republics are usually not called monarchies and vice versa; it is, 
however, very much possible that beyond the denomination of republic there is some 
form of dictatorship—there are many instructive examples of this from the Italian 
city-states of early modern-times to today’s Eastern European states.
There are various tools for processing the discrepancy between sense and refer-
ence in the context of state names, as well. It includes, among others, the frequent 
use of abbreviations. This is particularly characteristic for politicized or so-called 
imperial languages: in the times of the Soviet Union, the long forms of state names 
(state titles) of Soviet republics were rarely or never used in conversations. Instead, 
country names and shortened forms of state names were employed (e.g., in the case 
of Ukraine such an example was the Ukrainian SSR). It is a well-known fact that 
abbreviations also had a distracting function: for instance, the former German Dem-
ocratic Republic was often called GDR since this usage did not express, and thus 
rendered it redundant to question, whether this state was really “democratic” or not.6
The descriptive function is left in the background in those cases in which the 
determinants of the long form of state name do not simply indicate the state form in 
the name but attempt to legitimize the political and public law system denominating 
the state. In this case, they do not only indicate but also classify the form of state, 
for instance by calling the state “democratic”, “socialist”, “Arab”, “Islamic” republic 
or eventually “people’s republic”. In other words, they supplement the general com-
municative function by a political one. The aim of the aforementioned classifica-
tions is to represent, reinforce and endorse the dominant ideology of a particular 
state at the level of the state form (form of government), thus contributing to the 
legitimization of the political order with the state name itself. There are states—in 
the case of which we may even doubt the accuracy of one attributes—that duplicate 
6 For this example and its interpretation, see [28: 94] (on the function of abbreviations). For the political 
content of the abbreviation GDR, see [18: 93–107].
5 The long form of state name of Venezuela was determined by the 1999 Constitution that replaced the 
1961 Constitution and was adopted by a referendum at the proposal of Hugo Chávez [7].
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these attributes and call themselves, for instance, “democratic socialist republic” or 
“democratic people’s republic”.
A further function of state names is contributing to the identity protection of a 
community as well as to the creation of a new identity in those cases in which the 
nature of the state changes. Not only names but also changing or modifying names 
of states can serve certain functions. These are mostly similar to some of the main 
functions of names of state, but there are also differences. The basic functions of 
changing names are (a) the creation of a new identity for the community, (b) legiti-
mization a new political order of the state to be created, (c) the drawing a spectacu-
lar dividing line between the new and the old political regimes, (d) remembering the 
past, remember it otherwise or just missing something out of it, and so on. These 
functions will be spelled out and demonstrated in relation to changing the name of 
the state, determining, first, its two ways (name-giving and name change), second, 
the special functions that the change of state name fulfills in them, adding a few 
examples, too.
1.2  Giving Names for the Countries and Changing Names of States
Similar to human beings, the states acquire their names by someone’s giving them 
one. This can evolve in two main ways: by convention or by name-giving.
Denomination of states by linguistic convention concerns states whose names 
are based on peoples’ and nations’ names. Many state names evolved—with the 
transmission of country names—from the name of (one of) the people(s) living on 
the territory of the state, or directly corresponds with the country name.7 Although 
such denominations are natural, on the basis of European history, they may lead to 
uncertainty for two reasons. First, peoples themselves and their linguistic habits con-
stantly change. Second, individual countries may, for a shorter or longer period of 
time, fall under the “control” of different states. (This is so obvious that it suffices 
here to refer shortly to the troubled relationship of “Polish people”, the “land of the 
Poles” and the “Polish state” during the nineteenth century.) Furthermore, the con-
vention may sometimes be reversed in direction: it is not the state name that evolves 
from the name of the people living on its territory but the people or nation is named, 
after some time, based on the name of the state. At least this appears to be the case 
for the “first new nation” [c.f. 27], the American, and the United States of America. 
This reverse process could be illustrated with European examples as well.
The second way of the denomination of states is name-giving. Name giving has 
the following meaning: consciously and by a single act we assign a linguistic sense 
to something and identify it as well as have this identification approved in a nar-
rower or wider community. Certainly, in a philosophical sense, name-giving means 
much more than that. G. W. F. Hegel recognized that possession—apart from the 
“physical seizure” and “shaping”—of something takes place with “denotation”. This 
7 For these aspects of state names, basically those of country names see [1: 1348–1356].
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latter includes name-giving, among others. However, as Hegel argued, name-giving 
amounts not only to possession but also to creation. This idea occupied him from his 
late youth onwards; as he noted in the Jena Practical Philosophy, the entity of the 
cognitive acquisition of reality “gives a name to a thing” through its meaning, “and 
expresses this names as the existence of the subject, (…) [thus] presupposing the 
inner as existent”. Therefore, through name-giving, the renowned Hegelian Spirit 
(German: Geist) creates, acquires as well as takes possession of nature [15: 175].8
This idea of Hegel is, from certain perspectives, a reiteration of a Christian notion 
on names and name-giving, stemming from Jewish ideas, with the utilization of 
medieval debates on universals.9 This question cannot be examined here in detail; 
but it needs to be noted that the interpretation of words and names—beyond philo-
sophical problems—played a significant role in this dispute since, for Christians, the 
meaning of personal names in the Holy Scripture does not allow for its reconcili-
ation with the view of nominalists. For Christian thinkers, name-giving and name 
changing constitute the beginning of a new personality as they believe that names 
quasi “unfold” the essence and designation of a person.10
A significant interrelation is provided by the fact that he who gives a name, gives 
something that he does not possess—at least at first glance. “And what happens 
when we give a name? What do we give then?”—asks Jacques Derrida. In order not 
to leave his readers in doubt, he replies instantly: in such cases, “we do not offer one 
thing”, “we do not offer anything”; however, there occurs something that amounts 
to giving something that we do not possess—as the Good of Plotinus [12: 70]. A 
more accurate analysis of the situation of name-giving easily shows that this idea of 
Derrida conceived at a higher level of abstraction cannot be directly applied for the 
denomination of persons, things and, especially, states. It is true that he who gives 
a name to a state gives something that he does not possess, but he does possess 
something that is indispensable for the matching of sense and reference (name and 
person, name and state, etc.), thus something essential for name-giving. Namely, he 
has the right or power to influence language usage. Therefore, with respect to name-
giving, “creation” and “production” amount to influencing and shaping human rela-
tions—and in certain cases, to their transformation as regards the usage of names. 
That is why name-giving, as well as name change, is an emphatically political act 
that takes place in a legal framework.
Functions of renaming states can be ascertained by clarifying the main historical 
types of renaming, either by the evolution of convention or by name-giving. Based 
8 For the concept of possession, see [16: 60–63: par. 54–58]. For Hegel’s theory on names, see [4: 
74–77].
9 In the Bible, where “the man gave names to all the livestock, the birds in the sky and all the wild ani-
mals” (Gen, 2:20), name giving, creation and possession are also closely related: “Do not fear—said the 
Lord—, for I have redeemed you; I have summoned you by name; you are mine” (Isaiah, 43:1). This 
has appeared almost one-in-one in Hegel’s theory, expressed in philosophical terms. On Jewish ideas on 
names see Exodus 3:13–22.
10 C.f. Gen, 27:36, and Isaiah, 7:14. Worth a note here that when Jesus called Simon Cephas [Peter] in 
the text of the so-called promise to build the Church, he knew that this name is not understood by the 
Aramaic-speaking Jews; therefore, he explicitly referred to its symbolic meaning (“You are Peter, and 
on this rock I will build my Church…”), thus revealing the “real” or “actual” meaning” of the name; 
c.f. Mark, 3:16–19 and Matt, 16:18–21. For a possible philosophical background of these views see [31: 
383a–385e].
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on the experience of the twentieth century the following three main types of renam-
ing states can be distinguished here.
(1) Name change reflecting a complete change in the social, economic and politi-
cal nature of the state. A special subtype of this case is a historically rapid and 
comprehensive change in the social or economic “content” of the state called 
modernization.
(2) Name change concerning the disintegration of the great empires, when their 
subdivisions as successor states are renamed. Another variant of this type is 
when colonies become independent states.
(3) Name change connected to significant changes in the political content of the 
state. One variant of it is the change of the form of state (e.g. from monarchy to 
republic, or vice versa). We can classify here the permanent planned change the 
methods or institutions of political rule, and in the direction of the administra-
tion, without changing the form of state.
The following few examples illustrate these main types. The best-known exam-
ple of the first type is the Russian state, whose name has changed with revolution-
ary changes. In 1917 the Russian Empire (Poccийcкaя Импepия), a monarchy, 
became first, Russian Republic (Poccийcкaя pecпyбликa; September 1917), then, 
after 6  weeks, Soviet Russia or Russian Socialist Soviet Republic (Poccийcкaя 
coциaлиcти́чecкaя coве́тcкaя pecпу́бликa; November 1917). This latter was 
mutated into Soviet Union or Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Roccи́йcкaя 
Coве́тcкaя Фeдepaти́внaя Coциaлиcти́чecкaя Pecпу́бликa; 1922), which existed 
until 1991. These changes in the names undoubtedly reflected the complete transfor-
mation of the state, so the function of the name change is an indication of the new 
situation. Modernization of traditional empires in crisis and transformation of large 
historical states into modern ones also force a change of name, for similar reasons, 
as it has been shown in the case of Persia which became Iran in 1935, that of Siam 
which became Thailand in 1939,11 or that of Abyssinia which became Ethiopia in 
1941. The function of the name change is the same.
The disintegration of the compound states has so many ways, expressed in dif-
ferent naming methods as well, that there is no way to detail them here. I just men-
tion the dissolution of Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1918/1920, and the intri-
cacies of the naming of the successor states, like Austria, a republic, Hungary, in 
principle a monarchy, practically a “kingdom without a king”, and Czecho-Slovakia 
(later Czechoslovakia), two republics in federation with each other. Between 1920 
and 1944 the official name of the Hungarian state was the “Kingdom of Hungary” 
and this term was used in different ways; e.g. in the name of state organs, courts, 
authorities, and offices; even public notaries were “royal notaries”; it was written 
11 States are sometimes renamed permanently or temporarily to their former or original names; thus, for 
example, Thailand was renamed Siam between 1946 and 1948.
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on the cover of passports, etc. In the linguistic practice, however, the country name, 
“Hungary” was preferred and made part of the semi-official practice, e.g. printed on 
postal stamps or used even in international treaties. The reason for this was probably 
the aim to conceal the contradictions of the political and legal situation about the 
form of state established in 1920/21, designed to be a temporary solution, but lasting 
for 24 years.12 Other functions of this tricky combination of the two names were the 
result of its dual nature: the official name (referring to monarchy) was to carry on 
the historical tradition, so that it could be traced back to the foundation of state in 
the Middle Ages, and the country name as a semi-official name was to give the peo-
ple a new identity, based on a fictitious territorial vision rooted in the past as well.
Another typical case in this second group is the naming, sometimes renaming 
states during the time of colonial independence. Here too, the duality of traditional 
naming and giving a new identity causes some tension. In many cases, these states 
have chosen a new name in the process of becoming independent.13 Some of those, 
however, who have not done so, later might have changed their mind, because they 
would have liked to obscure or forget their colonial past. This was the case of how 
Dahomey became Benin (1975), Upper Volta became Burkina Faso (1984), and 
Ivory Coast declared to accept only the French version of its name in every lan-
guage, so became Côte d’Ivoire (1986).
The third main type can be exemplified by changing the name of Italy and Japan 
(both in 1946), naming the Régime de Vichy (1940), and renaming Hungary (2011). 
They are so different that the function of renaming must be looked at separately in 
each case.
The Italian state was renamed by a new constitution, approved by referendum, in 
1946 (in effect 1948). Then the Kingdom of Italy (Regno d’Italia) became the Ital-
ian Republic (Repubblica Italiana). In a similar vein, but not always by referendum, 
the name of the Greek state changed five times during the twentieth century (in the 
years 1920, 1924, 1946, 1967/1973, and 1975) due to the hectic political changes of 
that country. In both cases, the new names reflecting the forms of states indicated 
future changes in the political and administrative system.
The case of Japan is interesting because it shows, that it may happen that in the 
course of a significant constitutional change the form of state is left unaltered while 
the state title changes. After the Second World War, the name of the Empire of 
Japan changed to Japan—without any indication as to the form of state. Constitu-
tion of Japan (promulgated in 1946, enacted in 1947, and has never been amended 
since) uses the word “Japan” as state name only in its title and in two of its penul-
timate substantive articles [54: art. 97–98.]. On the basis of this constitution, the 
12 Hungary in this period was “governed by a temporary regent whose position was permanent”—com-
mented an analyst sarcastically; see [2: 10].
13 This was the case, for example, when the Dutch East Indies became Indonesia (1945/49), Northern 
Rhodesia became Zambia (1964), Southern Rhodesia became first Rhodesia (1964) later Zimbabwe 
(1980), Nyasaland became Malawi (1964), Bechuanaland became Botswana (1966), Basutoland became 
Lesotho (1966), Gold Coast became Ghana (1957), Togoland (which was a part of Gold Coast) became 
Togo (1960) British Honduras became Belize (1973), Ellice Island became Tuvalu 1978, Gilbert Island 
became Kiribati (1979), and New Hebridas became Vanuatu (1980).
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country name and state title of Japan are analogous, at least in the world’s main 
languages,14 thus, it does not contain any supplement pertaining to the form of state 
(form of government) or other public law factors. In a way, this can be called a “reti-
cent wording” if we have in mind that before 1945 the Japanese constitution con-
tained such a supplement. During the period between the beginning of the so-called 
Meiji Restoration (1867) and the end of the Second World War (1945), the long 
form of the state name of Japan was Empire of Japan (in other variants: Empire 
of Greater Japan; that is, Dai Nippon Teikoku, 大日本帝國). In my view the new 
name of 1947, namely Japan without the word of “empire”—in the context of pre-
1945 history, and with that in mind that the form of state (form of government) of 
Japan has remained monarchy (“empire”) even after 1947—can be considered a 
“reticence” about the information concerning the role the Japanese emperor played 
in the Second World War.
Most enigmatic are the cases whereby the form of state does not change to its 
reverse (i.e., from monarchy to republic or vice versa), but the name-giving power 
omits the form of state from its name either by supplementing it with a seemingly 
neutral word, e.g. with “state” or “commonwealth” or by putting the country name 
into the position of state title. This indicates that significant changes are to occur in 
the political system. It is only possible to determine the actual motive behind such a 
move in retrospect, while it generally takes place in case of a stealthy system change. 
I give here two characteristic examples of this issue.
The first was the case when Marshal Pétain changed the name of the French 
Republic to the French State (l’Etat français) in 1940. At the time of this change, 
it was not clear whether it constituted a part of the right-wing “national revolution” 
or it was a sign for the restoration of the monarchy. Nevertheless, the person of the 
omnipotent prime minister was accorded cultic honors while the state in its appear-
ances had already resembled an old-style monarchy. The question of whether Pétain 
would have restored monarchy or not has been left open as its system was blown 
away by the winds of history. The second example is provided by the renaming of 
the Hungarian state in 2011 whereby the name Republic of Hungary was changed to 
Hungary. Details of this issue will be discussed below.
2  Changing the Name of Hungarian State
2.1  Changing Names of the Hungarian State During the Twentieth Century
Renaming the Hungarian state in 2011 was the seventh change in the name of the 
state within the time horizon of a 100 years. The six earlier cases during the twenti-
eth century (in the years 1918, 1919, 1920, 1946, 1949 and 1989) were not only the 
times of name changes, but signify the key turning points of the history of Hungar-
ian nation, and also the main changes in the form of state (form of government). The 
14 This addition needs to be made because in Japanese language the name of the Japanese state is 日本
国 (Nippon-koku or Nihon-koku), which is literally the State of Japan.
 P. Takács 
1 3
lack of change in the form of state, however, does not mean that the change in the 
state name is not be related to the substantial transformation of the political system 
since a particular state form, both the republic and the monarchy, may give way to 
several political systems. The 2011 change of the name of the Hungarian state was a 
by-product of a change not in the form of state but in the political system. Therefore, 
its significance—in contrast to the official view and the interpretation of a few ana-
lysts—is not at all symbolic, inasmuch as it is taken in a “solely symbolic” and “not 
too important” sense, but very much essential.
The inevitable connection of the public legal nature of state power and renaming 
the state in modern history of Hungary can be illustrated as follows: see Table 1.
I make three additional comments on the interpretation of this table.
(a) As to the name of the Hungarian state before 1918, we have to keep in mind that 
the state name, just like the state itself, is a modern phenomenon. Before modern 
times formations of public power regarded as states were denoted according 
to the personal or the territorial aspects of domination. Therefore, the medi-
eval Archiregnum Hungariae was comprised of several regnums (kingdoms), 
apart from Regnum Hungariae; e.g. in the time of Andrew II of Hungary (thir-
teenth century), they amounted to seven, later to two. At the time of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, the country name Hungary was rarely used to denote the 
Hungarian state; instead, especially in emphasizing the situation and relation 
of the country within the Empire, the term Lands of the Crown of Saint Ste-
phen (German: Länder der Heiligen Stephans Krone, Hungarian: Szent István 
koronájának országai) was employed. The Act XVI of 1867, establishing the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire from the Hungarian side, used the name A magyar 
Table 1  Names of the Hungarian state during the  20th century and at present
before 1918 1918 1919 1920/21 1946 1949 1989 after 2011
FORM 
OF 
STATE
monarchy republic Soviet republic monarchy republic
Soviet 
republic republic           
STATE 
NAME
(state title) 
Kingdom
of 
Hungary
People’s
Republic
of
Hungary
Hungarian
Allied 
Socialist 
Soviet 
Republic
Kingdom
of 
Hungary
Republic 
of 
Hungary
People’s 
Republic
of
Hungary
Republic
of 
Hungary Hungary
COUNTRY 
NAME Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary 
As for the overlapping of the meanings of some terms, it is enough to make two short additions here. 1. 
The Soviet republic [Tanácsköztársaság] of 1919 was officially called “republic of councils” (German: 
Räterepublik), while the Soviet republic [Népköztársaság] of 1949 was officially a “republic of people” 
(German: Volksrepublik), respectively. 2. The expression People’s Republic [Népköztársaság] of 1918 
could be explained by the legitimacy objective assigning the people as the source of power (in contrast 
to that time cracked down monarchical legitimacy), and not by some special theoretical considerations 
regarding the form of state (form of government). The expression People’s Republic [Népköztársaság] 
of 1949 was used to bypass the usual but not too popular terms of the type of political order, e.g., the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, Soviet state, etc., exported by the Soviets to Eastern Central Europe in the 
mid-twentieth century.)
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korona országai (Lands of the Hungarian Crown) to denote the Hungarian state 
and not the Kingdom of Hungary.
(b) On 16 November 1918, at the proclamation of the republic, the National Coun-
cil, which could be considered as the constituent body, used the term “peo-
ple’s republic”. However, in the subsequent 4 months, the Hungarian state was 
referred to both as “people’s republic” and “republic”. Initially, the Council 
Republic proclaimed on 21 March 1919 was simply called the Republic or the 
Hungarian Soviet Republic. Although for ca. 10 days its long-form of state name 
was the Republic of Hungary, from 2 April 1919 on (pursuant to the temporary 
constitution, Decree XXVI of the Revolutionary Governing Council) the name 
Republic of Councils (Council Republic) was employed. The state name in the 
constitution, which was intended to be “final” but remained in force for ca. 
40 days and was adopted on 23 June 1919 by the National Assembly of Soviets 
(Councils), was Hungarian Allied Socialist Soviet Republic. After the fall of the 
Republic of Councils on 1 August 1919, the government of Julius Peidl defined 
the state form right away, on 2 August 1919 again as “people’s republic” and 
the state as Hungarian People’s Republic. The following government of István 
Friedrich changed the state name to the Republic of Hungary on 8 August 1919 
despite the fact that the name Hungarian People’s Republic also remained in use 
during his governance.
(c) In 1920, the text of Act I of 1920 “restoring constitutionalism (after the revolu-
tions)” did not elaborate the long form of the state name. The underlying reason 
was probably that in February 1920, at the time of adoption of this act, legisla-
tors did not yet know what form of state (form of government) the victorious 
powers of the First World War would prefer: republic or monarchy. During the 
peace talks, the name of the Hungarian successor state of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire—like that of Austria15 earlier—underwent changes. Whereas the pre-
paratory acts (made during the year 1919) of the Trianon Peace Treaty used 
the name “Hungarian Republic” for the future “signatory party”, the finalized 
version of the peace treaty signed on 4 July 1920 did not refer to the state form 
and denoted the new state on the basis of the country name (“Hungary”).16 For-
mer prime minister Stephen Bethlen recalled it in 1925 in the following way: 
15 In this similarity, however, there was an important difference. In the case of Austria, the problem was 
with the country name (originally German Austria: Deutschösterreich or Deutsch-Österreich), and not 
with the state title (republic), whereas in the case of Hungary the problem was with the state title (as to 
the intentions of the national delegation: kingdom), and not with the country name (Hungary). At the 
collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the name of the Austrian successor state was initially German 
Austria. The National Assembly of German representatives declared on 12 November 1918 that “Ger-
man Austria is a democratic republic” and consolidated this name in the temporary constitution of 14 
March 1919, as well. The name German Austria (Deutsch-Österreich), however, was not approved by 
the allied powers (the Entente)—presumably by reason of the frightening idea of the so-called greater 
Germany solution (Großdeutsche Lösung)—expressed their intention in May 1919 to conclude the peace 
treaty with the Republik Österreich (Austrian Republic). See the telegram of Chancellor Renner [32: 
194] as cited in [22: 14].
16 For the analysis of Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary (Trianon, 
4 June 1920) in the context of international law, see [23].
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“for whereas in its first draft of the Conditions of Peace it spoke everywhere of 
a Hungarian Republic, the Treaty of Trianon contains no such definition but 
speaks of our country throughout, without any designation of the form of gov-
ernment, simply as » Hungary«” [6: 450]. In Hungarian law, monarchy as the 
form of the state was first declared by the prime ministerial decree of 18 March 
1920 (2394/1920. M. E.), establishing—and, in a peculiar way for legislation, 
“explaining”—that the state form of Hungary is a monarchy. At the legislative 
level, slightly paradoxically, it was the Act XLVII of 1921 (adopted on 6 Novem-
ber 1921) declaring the dethronement of the House of Habsburg that established, 
or at least reinforced that the state form of Hungary is a monarchy.
I add to this, that there was a duality in the use of names between 1920 and 1944. 
Although the name of the state, in principle and officially, was “Kingdom of Hun-
gary”, in practice in many contexts the name “Hungary” was used, as I explained in 
some detail in Sect. 1.2, in order to conceal the paradoxies of the “kingdom without 
a king” situation. (On the problem of “monarchy without a king” see [37].) So the 
2011 renaming had some interwar reminiscences, as well, inasmuch as it was an 
informal practice at that time to call the state by country name, and the 2011 change 
was pointing in that direction, too.
Turning to the current situation, Table  1 clearly demonstrates that the 2011 
change in the state name evolved in a way that constitutional drafters introduced 
a new naming practice, not a new name: they qualified the country name as state 
name. It is important to note that on the basis of the country name, the Hungarian 
state could have been called in any context by its short form of state name “Hun-
gary” even before 2011, so this re-qualification was in the linguistic-grammatical 
sense unnecessary. Therefore, it can be stated that the Fundamental Law of 2011 did 
not, in fact, rename the state but made it impossible to use the name “Republic of 
Hungary”, or significantly reduced the possibility thereof. (See Sect. 3.2, below.) In 
a sense, the name change was used to suppress the word “republic”, and in this way, 
republican values in public discourses, making it impossible or harder to interpret 
the political community according to these values.
2.2  The Way of Renaming the Hungarian State in 2011
According to Article A of Chapter Foundation of the Fundamental Law of Hun-
gary adopted in 2011, “Hazánk neve Magyarország” (in Hungarian). This short 
sentence can be translated into English in two ways depending on the equivalent 
we find for the word “hazánk”. The official English translation of the text uses 
the words “our country” while a translation attached to a commentary written by 
authors who qualified themselves as “friends of the Fundamental Law” translates 
it as “our homeland”.
According to the former translation, the provision in question reads as follows: 
“The name of our country shall be Hungary” [56: 3], while according to the lat-
ter: “Our homeland shall be named Hungary” [3: 347]. The former prefers good 
style to the exact matching of words while the latter prefers the exact matching 
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of words to style and, not incidentally, to accurate translation. In fact, the second 
version would sound precisely as follows: “The name of our homeland shall be 
Hungary”, but this difference is irrelevant now. The argument that it is not about a 
simple question of translation techniques but about semantic disagreement moti-
vated by political views will be discussed below.
This short sentence indicated the renaming of the state for the following 
reasons:
• in Hungarian, just like in every language, there exists a general natural seman-
tic relationship between country and state, and between country name and 
state name;
• in some languages, for instance in Hungarian, mainly in political discourse 
the meaning of the word homeland can be, in principle and at the cost of some 
distortion in communication, extended to the “state” with the transmission of 
the word country;
• the constitutional power expressly included in the official explanatory note 
accompanying the bill of the Fundamental Law that it aimed at renaming the 
state, and not the county or the homeland [65: 35].
Adoption of the constitution in 2011 was followed by the changing and amend-
ing laws and other legal rules in line with the new provisions of the Fundamental 
Law, among them, what concerned the name. This meant that the earlier name of 
the state had to be rewritten in the various legal rules. Most of the work was done 
by the drafters of Act CCI of 2011 [59]. This law of gigantic size, including 437 
sections, amended the text of 307 other laws. Apart from providing for themati-
cally not interlinked provisions, it undertook three objectives regarding “words”. 
It
• replaced the term “Republic of Hungary” with the word “Hungary” in the text of 
hundreds of laws17;
• replaced the names of organs of governments and other public bodies modified 
by the Fundamental Law in the text of hundreds of valid laws with the name of 
those newly established, for instance, changed the name of Supreme Court to 
that of the old-sounding Curia,18 etc.,
• eradicated or at least made it rare the words constitution, constitutional and related 
words such as unconstitutional from the text of the valid Hungarian laws as much 
as it was possible. It has changed the word “constitution” to “fundamental law”, it 
17 For the legal system as a whole, this work also had to be done at the level of governmental regula-
tions. This was done by a decree [c.f. 64], entered into force on 1 January 2012. It performed the same 
function at the level of administrative regulations as the law mentioned above: it changed the name of the 
state in the text of numerous other governmental decrees, and made fewer of the expressions that were 
related to constitutionality.
18 It worth noting that the original name of the highest court before 1945 was not “Curia”, but “Royal 
Hungarian Curia”; the word “royal”, however, was not revitalized in 2011. Renaming of particular 
administrative organs and different courts has started in the period of constitutional democracy, between 
1990 and 2010. See on this [47: 13–15] (2014) and [26].
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has often replaced the word “constitutional” with “legal” or “lawful”, and some-
times changed the term “unconstitutional” to “anti-fundamental law”.19 (As the 
Fundamental Law did not render it illegal or illegitimate to use the words “con-
stitution” and “constitutional” in Hungary—it has even referred to constitutional 
values and the historical constitution, recognized the institution of constitutional 
complaint as well as the constitutional court as institution—, it could be the subject 
of a separate analysis what considerations influenced the drafters of the text of Act 
CCI of 2011 in their “eradication” and “rarefaction”. So far, no such analysis has 
been undertaken.)
The Fundamental Law entered into force on 1 January 2012. Tables at border 
crossing points on highways, driveways and along rivers, as well as other inscrip-
tions indicating the state borders were replaced in the last days of 2011. Courts and 
organs of public administration were renamed, their buildings got new signboard by 
the end of 2011.
The Hungarian Committee on Geographical Names officially determining coun-
try names and state titles as “geographical names” was disbanded in 2011 and 
reorganized in early 2012, and the new composition committee accepted its resolu-
tion in March. As to the resolution “it acknowledged” that according to the Funda-
mental Law the state is called “Hungary”, and modified the official list of country 
names, which is a list of state names as well, accordingly. The government, through 
its appropriate bodies, communicated the new name to the United Nations and the 
states with which Hungary had diplomatic and other kinds of relations, and notified 
the international organizations about the change. The renaming of the Hungarian 
state thus legally has taken place. The duration of this process, conceived in legal 
terms, has taken only a couple of months. Certainly, the renaming the state in a 
social and political sense has taken much more time.
The renaming of a state can be considered as socially complete as soon as the 
new name is used in all the contexts where the state name typically appears or 
should appear. Renaming a state in this sense requires years because the names of 
states appear in thousands of places: not only on inscriptions, on the boards of the 
coat of arms placed at the entrance of institutions, and on official stationery, but on 
identity cards and passports, on coins (not on banknotes in Hungary), sometimes on 
stamps of national post office (not in case of Hungary), and so forth—not to mention 
the everyday language usage of citizens. It changes from country to country whether 
the name of the state is included in the names of public companies and other enter-
prises, national railways, public schools, publicly maintained artistic ensembles or 
parks in public management. It is highly costly to change all of them: it does not 
come cheap to rename a state.
19 These changes were linked to the fact that in 2011 the conceptual relationship between the “funda-
mental law (basic law)” and the “constitution” was unclear both among the drafters of the new constitit-
uon, and among Hungarian scholars of public law. Some have speculated that the the constitution is part 
of the funadamental law, while others supposed that the two concepts refer to the same phenomenon. 
These conceptual uncertainties have not yet been clarified since that time. See on this [51: 8].
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Therefore, those renaming the Hungarian state decided—with some late wisdom 
in 2013—to display the new name on the aforementioned places and objects only 
after the “natural wear of inscriptions” containing the state name, thus, for instance, 
after the continuous change of identity cards. This continuous replacement of the 
documents, coins, coat of arms of different institutes, etc. was provided for in a pro-
vision, the most difficult to understand in the Hungarian legal system, namely in 
the fourth amendment of the Fundamental Law adopted on 25 March 2013 using a 
slightly euphemistic reference to “principles of responsible management”.
According to the almost incomprehensible Article 20 of the 2013 constitutional 
amendment, “[A]fter the entry into force of the Fundamental Law, the name refer-
ring to the Republic of Hungary may remain in use as a reference to Hungary in 
accordance with the legal regulations in force on 31 December 2011, until the tran-
sition to the use of the name under the Fundamental Law can be achieved in accord-
ance with the principles of responsible management”. This wording is not only 
stylistically but also semantically problematic for the Hungarian state was at that 
time, and still is a republic; therefore, the word “Hungary”, in fact, is an appellation 
“with reference” to the Republic of Hungary (perhaps we should say “to a republic 
of Hungary”), as well.20 On the basis of this text, one may even suggest that the 
legislature did not simply remove the word “Republic” from the state title, but even 
prohibited its use. Of course, formally it was not a formal legal prohibition, but the 
legislature worded the text of the law as if it were forbidden. The Hungarian state 
can still be called “Republic of Hungary”, instead of “Hungary” in non-legal texts, 
but this might sound like a protest against it,21 or might be misunderstood in differ-
ent contexts.
Although no relevant sociological surveys have been made, it can be established 
by way of simple observation that it took the new name a couple of years to be put 
into use and be reflected in the linguistic practice. In the case of Hungary, it has 
become manifest during the past years sociolinguistically that it took place, and by 
now—except the political parlance (which can be interpreted as a part of social lan-
guage usage as well)—it has been completed.
Finally, we can ask: has the renaming taken place politically as well? Perhaps it 
would be better to put this question this way: has the renaming been finished in the 
political sense by now? The renaming of a state can be argued to be politically com-
plete and finished if
(1) the new name is generally accepted not only in the official language but also in 
the everyday language usage, without specific pressure,
20 It would have been not only more classy but also more straightforward, thus intelligible, to use one of 
the following terms instead of that burdensome phrase (“the appellation with reference to the Republic of 
Hungary when referring to Hungary”): “the former name of state containing the state form of the repub-
lic”, or more simply and calling things by names, “the name Republic of Hungary”.
21 Therefore in the light of this wording of the rule, moving on the fringe of declaring something partly 
legal, partly illegal or non-legal, and qualifying a particular denomination of the the state accordingly, 
it was a meaningful wording to call the Fundamental Law of Hungary (2011) the “Constitution of the 
Republic of Hungary”, in an article published in 2013. See [40: notes 33, 35, 37, 38 and 41].
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(2) there is a generally felt consensus beyond this and manifested through speech in 
everyday language usage,
(3) the old name is not used for the critique of the political conditions of the state 
denoted by the new name. This third criterion belongs to the problem of social 
and political remembrance and forgetting, and it is impossible to deal with 
enough detail here.
According to criterion (1), the renaming of the Hungarian state can be consid-
ered as complete since people from all walks of life generally use the word Hungary 
instead of the Republic of Hungary in their everyday speech acts. Regarding crite-
rion (2), the renaming is only partially complete as a significant part of politically 
different groups accepts changes while another part still accepts them only with res-
ervations. (In this regard, accurate sociolinguistic surveys have not been undertaken; 
but even in their absence it can be stated that the distribution of groups supporting 
and opposing the government policies after 2011 roughly corresponds to the ratio of 
groups supporting and opposing this change in language.) As for the criterion (3), 
the term “Republic of Hungary”—in a positive context: as memory or objective—
relatively often appears in public demonstrations criticizing the new regime or some 
aspects of it, as a subject of political nostalgia and generally as a critique of the cur-
rent situation. In this regard, the renaming of the Hungarian state in a political sense 
cannot be considered complete at all.
I put forward the idea, that there is a fourth area of surveying the completion of 
the name change. This seems to be legal, though it is undoubtedly political. This 
is the performative utterances used by courts in the delivery of judgments. For it 
is connected to the repression of any item of the Republican language, I will come 
back to it later, in Sect. 3.2.
3  Circumstances, Consequences, and Reasons for the Change
3.1  The Semantic Background of the Renaming the Hungarian State
The renaming of the Hungarian state took place with the utilization of two semantic 
interrelations. The first concerns the exploitation of the overlapping semantic rela-
tionship between the words country and state while the second relates to the special 
interconnection between the concepts of homeland and state. Figures 1 and 2 illus-
trate these interrelations which are explained in detail below, under points A and B.
A. In many languages, the word country has a dual meaning: it refers, on the one 
hand, to the geographical territory and its complementing parts, and on the other 
hand, to the established institution called state. In other words, the state is not the 
exclusive reference of the word country.22 In most languages, the word state also 
22 This wording and terminology—namely, that a word with one sense (German: Sinn) can have dif-
ferent references (German: Bedeutung)—can be traced back to the analysis of Gottlob Frege. See [13: 
29–31].
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has a dual meaning referring to the institutionalized power and a certain authority, 
as well as to a particular geographical territory and its population.
This is why the state can be—among ideal circumstances—denominated on the 
basis of the country name and the country can be—among ideal circumstances—
identified on the basis of the state name. Under different circumstances, however, 
the two meanings—in the case of both words—may be in conflict with each other. 
In most cases, natural language usage easily resolves this semantic conflict. In case 
of such semantic conflict, in the case of the country name the territorial component 
will be emphasized while the institutional element becomes subordinated, whereas 
in the case of state name or state title the institutional component will be empha-
sized with the territorial element being subordinated by that. The semantic com-
plexity of these two words facilitated the linguistic handling of politically divided 
peoples, such as the Korean, and the German in the past, of politically divided ter-
ritories, like the island of Ireland, or of territories and peoples with temporarily sus-
pended states. In this latter sense, we still use the word Poland as a country name for 
a territory divided by great powers.
It is important that there is no general rule in any language that defines when to 
use the country name and when to use the state name (state title) for identifying 
the state. There is no such rule in international law or in the national legal system 
of Hungarian either. In international treaties, e.g., the Hungarian state was usually 
referred to as “Hungary” (not the “Kingdom of Hungary”) during the 1930s and as 
the “Republic of Hungary” (not Hungary”) during the 1990s.
Those renaming the Hungarian state in 2011 exploited this semantic complexity 
and the resulting flexibility of the country name. As is shown in Table 1, drafters 
of the Fundamental Law have put the country name “Hungary” into the position 
of the long form of state name or constitutional state name in 2011, thus prescrib-
ing that the Hungarian state cannot be denominated on the basis of its state form, 
namely as a republic. Whatever the aim of constitutional drafters was (I have hinted 
at this before, and will detail it later), it was to be achieved solely by an awkward 
and clumsy linguistic remedy, which is still sometimes under the necessity to claim 
that “the name of Hungary (as a state) is Hungary”.23
23 Therefore, it is no wonder that supporters of the renaming of the state (and among them the apologists 
of the post-2010 Hungarian political system) attempt to remove this linguistic clumsiness by employing 
various trickeries in argumentation. For instance, according to the author of a publication that serves 
as a training book for future political leaders, “with the state name »Hungary«, the Constitution [the 
Fundamental Law] abolished the linguistic dualism of country name and state name” [52: 51 (first ed.) 
65 (second ed.)]. This is, however, a “nonsense upon stilts” since the naming system of states applies 
to 195 states while the drafters of the Fundamental Law—whose power extends within the borders of 
Hungary—have not been in the position to change this international practice. Therefore, it is not only 
an obvious mistake but a fallacy, maybe misleading apologetics to claim that “there is no point to distin-
guish between country name and state name anymore”. Ibidem. Quite opposite, the point to distinguish 
these two categories is to realize the background reasons for changing the name of the state.
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B. The drafters of the Fundamental Law, however, could not state in their text that 
“the name of Hungary as a state is Hungary”. Thus, they employed a different tool 
in order to arrive at a solution. They provided that “[t]he name of our homeland 
shall be Hungary”, thus establishing a link between the meaning of the word 
homeland and the concept of state.
This link would not be facilitated by natural language usage, however. In order 
for this sentence to be considered as the renaming of the Hungarian state, a devia-
tion had to take place from the natural semantics of language. In the given case, this 
happened in a way that the drafters incorporated the word “homeland” in the context 
of “country” and “state”, thus homogenizing the meaning of the words country and 
state. This is a characteristic method of political parlance.
In every day (non-political) language usage, homeland stands for the land where 
one was born together with all the positive feelings one feels for that, as well as for 
the place where one gets along, thus considers it his home both emotionally and 
culturally. It is a place or wider region one is attached to culturally by reason of his 
birth or growth, socially by reason of his progress in life, and emotionally in both 
cases. Normally, it does not refer to the state because the word homeland has a per-
sonal meaning, while—in modern societies for the majority of people—the meaning 
of the word state is impersonal and institutional.24 Therefore, for people socialized 
under Hungarian linguistic conditions seeing the world in the semantic framework 
characteristic for Hungarian culture, the sentence “[t]he name of our homeland shall 
be Hungary” means neither that (a) “the name of the Hungarian state shall be Hun-
gary” nor that (b) “from now on, the name of the Republic of Hungary shall be 
Hungary”.
The territorial component of the word country may create some very general link 
between the meanings of homeland and state: namely, homeland relates either to 
place of birth (viz., through one’s parents) or to the place where one grew up. In 
order for this link emerging, the word homeland had to be put in the context of state, 
thus it had to be politically reinterpreted: the place where one was born and grew up 
constitutes not only his homeland but also his state.
Such wording had a precedent in Hungarian political discourse, namely in the 
1970s’ Communist Hungary. To illustrate it with a single example from the period 
in question, one of the slogans of the Communist Party for the 1st of May parade 
was the following: “Long live and thrive our beloved homeland, the Hungarian Peo-
ple’s Republic!” For most of the people, the Hungarian People’s Republic meant 
not their homeland but the state under whose authority they lived. Considering the 
interrelation above, their homeland was Hungary. With this slogan, the Communist 
Party aimed at transferring the positive emotional commitment from the homeland 
to the state. This transfer was facilitated by the fact that the homeland was denoted 
with the long form of the name of the state. This artificially constructed linguistic 
practice attempted to legitimize the political regime of that time. The same tech-
nique was used in other Communist countries, as well. In the German Democratic 
24 For a detailed evaluation of this issue, see [44: 1–10].
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Republic, for example, this slogan was issued at a national holiday in 1986: “Alles 
für unser sozialistisches Vaterland und für die Sicherung des Friedens” (“Everything 
for supporting our socialist homeland and for ensuring peace”) [66: 1]. See also the 
text of the national anthem of the GDR, written by Johannes R. Becher, which also 
operated on the term Vaterland (homeland) [5: 61].
At the renaming the Hungarian state, the drafters of the Fundamental Law in 
2011—certainly with a different purpose, and probably unconsciously—engaged in 
continuing this linguistic practice of the Communist past. Figure 2 shows the seman-
tic scheme of reinterpreting linguistic meanings with a political purpose.
3.2  The official justification and actual reasons for name change
Regarding the debates on the renaming of the Hungarian state, that took place 
mainly in the first half of the past decade, it is worth making a distinction between 
official and non-official justification. The renaming was one of the first steps in the 
transformation of the Hungarian constitutionalism, public law, and political system. 
Since the actual course of the transformation—due to its stealthy nature [c.f. 33]—
was apparent only later, the proponents of the official view might have considered it 
important in 2011 to hide the motive of renaming. The “official view” emphasized 
one or more of the following three claims and arguments.25
Firstly, it was said that that the renaming enhanced or expressed historical con-
tinuity.26 The disputable nature of this claim was referred to above when I noted, 
the country in question was called “the Land of the Crown of Saint Stephen” even 
though the name “Hungary” was also employed. The grammatical root of the words 
of the country name—the adjective constituting the basis of both the so-called exo-
nym (English: Hungary, German: Ungarn, French: Hongrie) and the endonym (in 
Hungarian: Magyarország)—is undoubtedly very old. The name of the nation (Hun-
garian: Magyar), however, became interlinked with the word “country” (Hungarian: 
ország) relatively late. For these reasons, the name of the country in question has 
not been Hungary “for a thousand years”—even though the word Magyar and its 
equivalents in foreign languages have a very long history. I add to that here that the 
renaming of the state in 2011—as it is apparent from the above—constituted not 
historical continuity, but was, on the contrary, the interruption of continuity. It inter-
rupted a century-old tradition that was based on the distinction between the coun-
try name and state name and introduced a new naming practice. The argument of 
25 The official view is available in [43]. In this context, the term “official” means that these arguments 
were formulated, uttered, and emphasized by those decision-makers, who have the job and responsibil-
ity to justify legislative decisions. One of the talking partners of this conversation was a member of the 
European Parliament and presumably a drafter of the constitution, the other one is a Member of Parlia-
ment in Hungary.
26 As József Szájer argued in an interview, “[r]egarding the renaming of the country, it is the sign of 
continuity […], it is evident that Hungary’s name has been Hungary for a thousand year; [therefore] this 
continuity is better expressed by a name disregarding the [republican] form of state” [43: 59].
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historical continuity is disputable also on the account that the Hungarian state could 
be called Hungary already before 2011—without changing of the long form of state 
name or constitutional state name.
Secondly, it has been emphasized that the renaming was—as they said—“only 
symbolic”, either in the sense that it was some trivial thing not affecting the essence 
of the matter as it does not change the state form27 or in the sense that the cor-
rect use of symbols was also politically correct and effective.28 Constitutional law-
yers committed to the new system, or (as they call themselves with some contro-
versial ambiguity) “friends of the Fundamental Law” emphasized the “symbolic 
state 
state title
state name
country
country name
Fig. 1  Semantic difference between the words country and state in standard usage
Fig. 2  The semantics of the words country, state, and homeland in political usage
country
(country name )
state
(state 
title)
homeland
homeland
28 According to Gergely Gulyás, “[e]veryone can admit that it is worth using symbols that the country’s 
citizen feel attached to and employ. And so far, everyone has regarded Hungary and not the »Republic of 
Hungary« their homeland” [43: 61].
27 Similarly, as József Szájer argued, “[i]t is not about our aim to change the state form” [43: 59].
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importance” of the renaming: as an analyst argued, the renaming “aims at narrowing 
the gap between the country and the State. Patriotism in Hungary means that most 
Hungarians have an emotional tie to the country, whereas it does not mean that they 
have any kind of relation to the State. The new wording envisages a stronger connec-
tion between country and State: one cannot be a good patriot without being a good 
citizen.” [34: 59]. It is true that there is a significant discrepancy between the rela-
tion of citizens to the country and the state in Hungarian society, but this can only 
be remedied by a state policy following the right principles, democracy, openness, 
rights, etc., and not by renaming the state.
Thirdly, it often appeared in the official argumentation justifying the name change 
that the cessation of the name “Republic of Hungary” did not mean the intention 
to change the form of state, namely the restoration of the monarchy. As it has been 
argued, there is “no political need and intention for such a thing in Hungary” [43: 
59]. A scholar used similar wording in the academic literature of constitutional law: 
“The change [of the name of the state] does not suggest the consideration of chang-
ing the form of the State (re-establishment of the monarchy)—Hungary remains a 
republic (…)” [34: 59]
Since the critique of republican ideas had been present in Hungarian political 
struggles for years, the other side of the debate did not regard this argument sin-
cere and thus feared the restoration of the monarchy for different reasons.29 There-
fore, proponents of the official arguments were obliged to prove their intentions. 
This led to a situation where the official view regarding the question of the republic 
became flexible, or rather pliant: they emphasized that the idea of the republic was 
historically insignificant in Hungary; however, constitutional drafters did not choose 
a different form of state, namely monarchy, for the country. In a similar vein, the 
“republic” was not worthy to be included in the state title but for some reason, it was 
worthy to remain as the form of state after the adoption of a new constitution.
This elastic argumentation highlighted a specific interrelation which later became 
apparent, although it has never become the official view. Namely, that the aim of the 
renaming of the state was to further weaken the already frail republican tradition in 
Hungary.30 By that—according to the actual intention of constitutional drafters—
the change might have contributed to the legitimization of the planned new political 
regime to some degree and so helped distinguish it sharply from the earlier consti-
tutional democracy. If true, it confirms that in the Hungarian political elite there is 
a relatively widespread belief that the republican ideas do not have enough poten-
tial for legitimization; therefore, it might be useful to emphasize the opposite and to 
revive some formalities of monarchical tradition. And it is well known that monar-
chical formalities do not always require real monarchs.
29 As Viktor Orbán argued in 2006, then as leader of the opposition, “for us, the republic is an empty 
word, (…). Our future is in the nation and not in the republic (…)” [67: 1]. The wording of a politician in 
2011 was as follow: “The republican form of state did not play such a role in Hungarian history, it does 
not have a surplus content that would justify its emergence in the country name” [43: 59].
30 In this regard, an analyst stated in 2018 that “the exclusion of the term republic from the constitutional 
state name can also be interpreted as the departure from republican ideas and traditions” [50: 71].
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It is not a coincidence that five states, all in the region of Central Eastern Europe, 
do not include the word republic in the long-form of their state names (state titles) or 
constitutional names—despite all be republics. Currently, these are Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, Hungary, Montenegro, Romania, and the Ukraine. And we may include 
here a sixth one, the Polish state. Its state title in Polish is Rzeczpospolita Polska, 
and the word rzeczpospolita is generally translated to several languages as repub-
lic despite the fact that its English equivalent would be, in fact, commonwealth.31 
The word rzeczpospolita currently means for the Poles republic but there was a time 
when it referred to a kingdom. So Rzeczpospolita Polska can be translated into Eng-
lish not (only) as Republic of Poland, but as Commonwealth of Poland (too).
To sum it all up, I claim that these countries aspire to a state of political existence 
somewhere between the monarchy and the republic which I will detail in the next 
section. All this is not to say that a change of the form of state is to be expected in 
these countries in the near future, but rather that some of them are keen to revive 
the monarchical traditions and establish public law systems that can be qualified as 
a transition between the republican and the monarchical order. If this is plausible, 
Hungary is one of these countries.
Before turning to this mixed or transitional public law system I return briefly to 
the problem of the way of delivering judgments by the courts, which I have dropped 
before. One of the manifestations of the anti-Republican, though not necessarily 
monarchist, attitude and the consequence of renaming the state is to change the lan-
guage used by authorities.
This may be demonstrated by showing the changes in the wording of the procla-
mation of court judgments. It is known that in many countries—typically in the legal 
systems of the continental Europe, less so in common law jurisdictions—judgments 
are proclaimed in a ritual way, with a bound, traditional sentence as a special form 
of performative utterances, the function of which is to bring the particular judgment 
into contact to the state, and so to the legal system as a whole. The function of these 
legal rituals is analyzed from time to time [36: 53–75]. This performative utterance 
is that judgments are pronounced “in the name of the people”, “in the name of the 
state”, “in the name of the law”, “in the name of the republic”, and the like. Some 
examples are as follows. In France the République française/Au nom du Peuple fran-
çais, in Spain the En nombre del Rey, in the Netherlands the Im Naam des Konings, 
in Germany the In Namen des Volkes, in Italy the In nome der Popolo Italiano, and 
in Russia the Oт имeни Poccийcкoй Фeдepaции formulas are used. In those coun-
tries where this formula refers to the name of the state, like in Hungary, the word-
ing of them necessarily changes every time when the name of the state (state title) 
changes.
In Hungary during the twentieth century (some historical details: [45: 34–38]) 
and at the beginning of this century court judgments were and are pronounced with 
the following performatives.
31 While the Poles have a specific word for the republic (Polish: republika), they call their own republic 
rzeczpospolita. This word, beyond the fact that it may be used to refer to the Polish-Lithuanian Common-
wealth, was originally used to denote the aristocratic national community supplemented with the chosen 
kingdom, later (in the seventeenth–eighteenth century) the monarchy, while only since the first half of the 
twentieth century has it been used for the republic.
1 3
Renaming States—A Case Study: Changing the Name of the Hungarian…
before 1918:
in 1918:
in 1919:
between 1920 and 1930:
between 1930 and 1944:
between 1946 and 1949:
between 1949 and 1989:
between 1989 and 2012:
after 2012:
“In the name of His Majesty the King…”
“In the name of the Republic of Hungary…”
“In the name of the Council Republic…”
“In the name of the Hungarian State…”
“In the name of the Hungarian Holy Crown…”
“In the name of the Republic of Hungary…”
“In the name of the Hungarian People’s Republic…”
“In the name of the Republic of Hungary…”
– [no such performative]
These utterances were prescribed by different procedural and organizational laws. 
The last ones (used between 1989 and 2012) [see 60–63] were repealed by the Act 
CLXI of 2011 [59]. According to its provision court judgments need not refer to the 
name of the Republic of Hungary or to the State of Hungary. This Act has abolished 
the old formula but has not introduced a new one. The reasons for that, namely for 
not introducing a new formula are unknown. The legislator might have supposed 
in 2011 that the formula “In the name of Hungary!” would be a bit clumsy, that of 
“In the name of the Hungarian Holy Crown!” would be (still) alienating to many, 
and that of “In the name of the Hungarian state!” might not have come to anyone’s 
mind. All we can say for sure is that the legislator wanted to cancel the reference for 
the name of the Republic of Hungary. This means that when judgments are handed 
down, the courts pronounce them mentioning their own particular name, and they 
do not have to refer to the state, even they should not mention its name.
3.3  Name of State and Form of State
The obvious contradiction between the official justification and actual reasons for 
changing the name of the Hungarian state in 2011 highlights that the debate on the 
renaming the state (“name debate”) could have easily evolved into a debate on the 
form of state,32 more specifically into a debate on the value of the republic as politi-
cal form (“republic debate”). It has, however, not evolved into that, in spite of the 
fact that at the time the Fundamental Law was adopted, many in Hungary feared that 
the change of the name of the state prepared the ground for a possible future change 
of the form of state, and despite the other fact that those groups that opposed the 
political changes of the post-2010 period have focused on republican ideas in their 
parlance. Fears regarding the restoration of monarchy have proven to be unfounded 
so far. It is possible to argue that all this happened because changing the form of 
32 Throughout this paper, the terms form of state or state-form (French: les formes d’Etat, German: die 
Staatsform) are used to designate the public law structures that reflect and reinforce the most significant 
elements of political relations, mainly in relation to, and expressed by, the selection, responsibility, and 
status of the head of state. In this general sense these forms—although they have several classifications 
and typologies—have been divided into two main categories (“monarchy” and “republic”) since the six-
teenth century, whatever we may hold about their value in contemporary political science. In English this 
general meaning of the form of state is also expressed by the term form of government (French forme de 
gouvernement, German: Regierungsform).
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state would have been politically impossible or personally impracticable. In my 
view, however, it is a misinterpretation of the case.
The analysis of the case shows that contrary to the above assessment and con-
cerning the form of state the main feature of the post-2010 era of Hungary was a 
significant departure from republican forms in such a way that the primary features 
of the other main form of state, the monarchy, have not been developed, at least in 
terms of the formally regulated and outright decision-making procedures, in legally 
defined competences or in overtly stated structures of responsibilities. This is not to 
say that decision-making processes and procedures substantially do not remind us 
of some sort of a monocracy. On the contrary, one of the main characteristics of the 
state emerged with the Fundamental Law of 2011 and the subsequent transforma-
tion of the legal system is that the organization of the government has formally pre-
served the distinctive forms of a parliamentary republics (prime minister in charge 
of the parliament, president with representative functions etc.), but substantially it 
operates in a monocratic manner. The present form of state of Hungary might be 
located, shapelessly though, somewhere between the monarchy and the republic. It 
may sound strange, of course, that a form of state is shapeless, but the floating fea-
ture of the basic political and public law structures of the state cannot be otherwise 
described.
Oddly enough, this hovering and floating feature of the basic structure of state 
corresponds truly, after decades of a historical break, to that of the first major period 
of the new Hungary of the twentieth century (1920–1944), commonly known as the 
Horthy era. In that period Hungary had a similarly “shapeless” form of state, termed 
“monarchy without a king”. From a monarchist’s point of view, this might have been 
a doorstep of a republic; from a republican’s point of view, if any at that time, it was 
a doorstep of a monarchy. Analyzing this situation the Austrian public and adminis-
trative lawyer, Adolf Merkl, a student of Hans Kelsen, argued in 1925 that the form 
of state of Hungary was a “clear-cut and genuine republic” and more specifically 
an “aristocratic republic with royalist features” [48: 34], whereas the constitutional 
lawyers of Hungary, e.g. Móric Tomcsányi and others, considered it a de jure (but 
not a de facto) monarchy [53: 301–304]. This mixed nature of de iure and de facto 
elements of public law was colloquially expressed by the ironic terms of the “royal 
republic” [49: 5, 7–8]33 and “a monarchy without a king”. The irony is explained 
by the fact that a “kingdom without a king” was neither a genuine monarchy nor a 
(genuine) republic, but everyone acted as if it were the first.
Designers of the post-2010 constitutional and political system undertook to 
build up a new state which is just as mixed and mingled in its de facto working 
ways, as the interwar version was. Even the “formally maintained republic” with a 
monocratic decision-making system seems to be analogous to the “formally main-
tained monarchy” of interwar period with a tint of “aristocratic republic”, to use 
33 The term “royal republic” is not the same as the “crowned republic”, coined by Lord Tennyson 
and applied by James Bryce describing democratic trends in Norway (see [9: vol. 2: 322]), neither the 
“monarchical republic” used sometimes for qualifying the reign of Queen Elizabeth I or that of Mary I 
by historians (see [11: 31–57, 21: 52]).
1 3
Renaming States—A Case Study: Changing the Name of the Hungarian…
Adolf Merkl’s term here. The two systems are similar in the preservation of appear-
ances: the first in the preservation of monarchical, the second in the preservation 
of republican semblances, whereas the first was leaning towards aristocratic style, 
the second toward monocratic style decision-making. This compound and mingled 
character or floating feature of the form of the state fits in well with classifications 
of political regime by contemporary constitutional lawyers as autocracy [25: 36–41, 
46: 531–570], a special form of autocracy [35: 545–583] or authoritarian regime 
[14: 299–302, 38: 1–30, 39: 15, 40: 296–313]. Both are thought of somewhere in the 
middle of an imaginary scale between democracy and totalitarianism.
This case study has shown that renaming the state was one of the signs of the 
deployment of a new constitutional system. Changing the name of the institution-
alized political community and—as one expert put it—“the ultimate symbol of… 
[the] statehood”,34 has predicted that a new constitutional and political system 
would be built in Hungary. It may sound plain hindsight, but it is much more. Since 
the name change was not without antecedents in the field of the (re-)presentation of 
the state I claim that changing the name of the state in the Fundamental law 2011 
has represented the breakthrough in this continuity. It was a sign whose meaning 
was understood by few in 2011 because it had many meanings, compressed into a 
historical one, the return to the appearance of historical continuity. And as historical 
content unfolded during the last decade, the meaning of this sign became more and 
more specific.
The immediate antecedents of this situation during the years of constitutional 
democracy, namely during the years of republic between 1990 and 2010, are also 
worthy of note. Four important steps could be mentioned here. The first was, as a 
prelude, the adoption of the coat of arms (escutcheon) of the country, in 1990, in 
which the representation of the royal crown rests on the traditional shield of a repub-
lic. See [55: art 1(2)]. The second was the revitalization and fostering the doctrine 
about the royal crown, called “Holy Crown doctrine” as a special kind of theory 
and ideology which—as the opposite of republicanism, highly esteemed during the 
interwar era—was even provided serious support by legislative declarations.35 The 
third step was bringing the “relic” into life in 2000: the moving of the royal crown 
from the National Museum to the building of the Parliament and placing it in exactly 
the same place where the first republic had been proclaimed on 16 November 1918. 
And finally, the fourth step was the re-dissemination of the doctrine of the so-called 
historical constitution, hoping that it will come to a new life, will be vitalized, and 
the ideas behind them will fertilize the new life of the state [51: 1–8]. These were all 
signs that in 1990 the interwar “monarchy without a king” was followed by a repub-
lic, established and maintained by no Republicans in the majority, which has been, 
to say with some exaggeration, a republic without republicans.
34 The name of a state is “the ultimate symbol of… [the] statehood”, and it is “a crucial element of the 
self-conception of a state and its population” being able to mobilize “deep feelings” in the population of 
a state [8: 34].
35 See e.g. the preamble of Act I of 2000 called the royal crown “Holy Crown” and declared it a “relic”, 
that—quoting the wording of the law—“embodies the continuity and independence of the Hungarian 
state” [58]. See some details in [30: 17–18].
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What is the semiotic lesson of this story, if any, and how could it be summarised? 
First, if semiotic is a discipline for studying anything which can be used in order to 
lie (as Umberto Eco has put it succinctly, maybe a little hastily), this case study may 
show that there are cases where detection of truth or lies of words possible only in 
historical and sociolinguistic perspective. Second, names are “only words”, so tiny 
things, like breath (as it was stressed during the medieval nominalism-debate), but 
they are able not only to become part of social reality but to express whole alterna-
tive worlds of this reality. Third, this analysis hopefully showed that the renaming 
of the Hungarian state had an expressive and a constitutional function as well. The 
first was eliminating republican discourse and weakening republican structures by 
obscuring the vision of a working republic, the second is the indication of a step 
towards an authoritarian regime. And although they are not causes of each other, 
each of them promotes the other, so their co-occurrence and association show that 
from the one the other could be inferred.
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